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ABSTRACT
Comparative studies often highlight the negative effects of federalism for
welfare state expansion. We examine Brazil and India, which have both
enhanced their welfare effort despite political fragmentation. We argue that
federalism’s effects must be seen together with degrees of party system
nationalisation. In Brazil, new social policies have reinforced a move towards
greater party system nationalisation. Control over anti-poverty programmes
has been recentralised leading to more even outcomes. In India, while the
central government also introduced new social policies, expansion has been
filtered by political regionalisation. The effectiveness of social provision relies
on state governments, producing substantial territorial differentiation.
KEYWORDS Federalism; multi-level elections; party system nationalisation; inter-governmental relations;
social policy; Brazil; India
The dispersal of political power within complex multi-level structures of gov-
ernment can present challenges for the development of welfare states. A size-
able literature on federalism and welfare states in advanced industrialised
economies suggests that the fragmentation that accompanies federalism is
bad news for social policy. Cross-national comparative studies highlight fea-
tures such as horizontal competition between federal sub-units, vertical
inter-governmental competition and the multiplication of veto points
within multi-level government which are argued to undermine coordination,
empower special interest groups andmake it harder to achieve improvements
in social provisioning (Bonoli & Champion, 2015; Champion & Bonoli, 2011;
Huber, Ragin, & Stephens, 1993; Obinger, Leibfried, & Castles, 2005; Pierson,
1995; see also Gerring, Thacker, & Moreno, 2005 for a related argument
applied to a wider range of cases). Furthermore, the complex and often
opaque relationships and divisions of responsibilities between levels of
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government in federal systems reduce the ability of voters to hold govern-
ments accountable for policy performance (Cutler, 2004). The very goals of
federal constitutional settlements, to protect self-rule alongside shared rule,
may work against efforts to extend equal social rights across a country
because federalism, especially in multi-ethnic contexts, also depends upon
the recognition of difference (Obinger et al., 2005, p. 2).1
Yet much of the existing literature treats federalism as an undifferentiated
variable which often serves simply as a proxy for political fragmentation or
decentralisation without taking into account significant variation in structures
of federalism across countries and the effects of intervening variables such as
degrees of political, fiscal and administrative (de)centralisation or party system
nationalisation. Cross-national studies also depend typically on national
averages that obscure the subnational differences that result from the decen-
tralisation of power over social policy in federal systems (Greer, Elliott, & Oliver,
2015). Lastly, most of the existing literature on the effects of federalism on
social policy draws on case studies from advanced industrial countries with
mature welfare states. The implications of federalism in low and middle-
income countries, often in the process of attempting the simultaneous conso-
lidation of both democracy and welfare provision, have been little studied. In
the wake of several decades of decentralisation across the developing world,
as well as the increasing attention to federalisation within middle-income
countries as a response to conflict and debates about regional equity, the
impact of federalism on welfare in such countries deserves greater attention.
In this paper we explore the cases of Brazil and India. Both countries saw the
adoption of far-reaching new social policies in the 2000s despite the tendencies
towards fragmentation and policy stasis supposedly inherent in their federal
institutions. In earlier decades, such fragmentation had been seen as a reason
for the lack of progress on ‘equity enhancing change’ (Weyland, 1996, p. 5).
We argue here that one feature of federalism that fuelled and shaped social
policy expansion in a period of growing government revenues was competition
between different levels of government to claim credit for anti-poverty pro-
grammes in the eyes of voters. But we argue that this tendency must be inter-
preted in conjunction with patterns of party system nationalisation. Both
countries were governed at the federal level by parties with social democratic
commitments which predisposed some of their leaders to pursue welfare as a
goal in its own right. In both places national parties saw the opportunity to
use social policy to reach out directly to poor voters over the heads of subna-
tional governments. Yet their strategies had different results.
In Brazil, conditional cash transfers (CCTs) – the largest of new social
policy commitments – have been a vehicle for the nationalisation of
credit claiming around social policy by political parties at the centre.2
Whereas previously the delivery of anti-poverty programmes was more cli-
entelistic, programmes such as Bolsa Família challenged local oligarchies
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and enhanced the prestige of the Workers’ Party at a national level (at least
before the anti-corruption investigations that began in 2014). This helped to
ensure that the programme was implemented fairly evenly across Brazil
(Fenwick, 2016). The centrality of social provision in the political legitimation
strategies of successive presidential coalitions from the mid-1990s onwards
reflected what Carlos Pereira and Frederico Bertholini in this special issue
describe as a ‘dominant belief’ in social inclusion with fiscal responsibility
that cut across parties (see also Alston, Melo, Mueller, & Pereira, 2016,
p. 116). By contrast, in India, even in an era since 2004 when the federal
government took on a larger role in the design and funding of new or
enhanced national social policies such as the Mahatma Gandhi National
Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme, or the National Food Security Act
(NFSA), it is state governments that have been more successful in claiming
credit for welfare measures. Although the Congress Party at the national
level sought to derive electoral mileage from new social policies, state govern-
ments (including opposition-ruled states) were relatively successful in claim-
ing a significant degree of credit for federal policies and many also ran
their own programmes. Moreover, reforms to ensure the more effective
delivery of anti-poverty programmes have depended on the initiative of indi-
vidual states. There is considerable unevenness in the extent to which chief
ministers have over-hauled local systems to insulate social programmes
from clientelistic pressures and enabled more reliable implementation.3
We show in this paper that inter-governmental competition had different
consequences in Brazil and India because of significant differences between
the two countries in degrees of party system nationalisation. In Brazil, the
introduction of new federally financed social policies, especially CCTs, has
reinforced – and been reinforced by – a move towards greater party system
nationalisation. These programmes allowed the national government to
move into areas that had previously been the preserve of states, effectively
recentralising control over anti-poverty programmes. As the programmes
became popular they helped bolster multi-level electoral alignment and
increased the incentives for subnational politicians to take on federal party
labels or support federal coalitions (Melo, 2008, p. 184). In India, state govern-
ments successfully claim much of the credit for social policy in the eyes of
voters,4 even when these policies are designed and funded by the govern-
ment in New Delhi. This scenario is supported by the regionalisation of
India’s party system. Unlike Brazil, state- and national-level elections take
place according to different timetables in India. Elections to the subnational
tier have a substantial degree of autonomy from the national level, and
social welfare has become an increasingly prominent part of state-level elec-
tion contests in recent years. The decentralisation of credit claiming for social
policy supports, and is supported by, the relative regionalisation of India’s
party system.
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In emphasising the interaction of federalism with degrees of party system
nationalisation, we bring together two literatures that do not often refer to
each other but may have important implications for understanding the trajec-
tory of welfare state development beyond Europe and North America. We
note that historically the development of welfare states in post-war Europe
was located alongside the development of national party systems and the
replacement of more regional or particularistic political identities by nation-
wide social cleavages framed around class (worker–owner) cleavages in the
post-industrialisation context (Caramani, 2004; Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). The
experience of war also had the effect of increasing national solidarity which
many authors have linked to the growth of welfare states (Burke, 1985;
Singh, 2016, pp. 244–248). There is some evidence to suggest that more natio-
nalised party systems see higher levels of social spending because parties are
incentivised to provide broad public goods to appeal to a wide electorate,
rather than providing more localised, targeted goods to particular constituen-
cies (Hicken, Kollman, & Simmons, n.d.; Castañeda-Angarita, 2013; Jurado,
2014).
In both India and Brazil, the development of social provision has been
debated without the kind of national ideological political cleavages that
were associated with welfare state emergence in earlier periods and other
geographies. Although ideology and class matter in both countries, in
neither are party systems organised around a clear left-right axis. Therefore,
the extent of party system nationalisation per se may loom larger as an expla-
nation for the design of social provision. While Brazil has a lower level of party
nationalisation than other parts of Latin America because of the profound pro-
liferation of parties encouraged by its electoral system, it has a considerably
more nationalised party system than India where the institutionalisation of
territorialised identities within its multi-ethnic federal system has under-
pinned the regionalisation of its party system. It has been argued recently
that in India, it is the cohesiveness of subnational identities within individual
states that is pivotal for understanding development outcomes (Singh, 2016).
In this article we first bring together a discussion of the existing literature
on federalism’s effects for welfare provision with that on multi-level electoral
systems to establish the contrasting institutional and electoral patterns in
Brazil and India. We then move on to compare structures of federalism and
party systems in the two countries, before analysing how these structures
produce different outcomes for the politics and implementation of social
policy in both countries. The article focuses largely on the period of fiscal
and economic expansion in both countries in the 2000s and early 2010s. In
Brazil, growth fuelled by the commodity boom combined with an increase
in tax revenue facilitated expanded redistribution. In India, rapid service-
sector driven economic growth also produced new revenues that were
invested in part in the social sector.5 A brief epilogue will consider the
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period since 2014 in which new fiscal and political pressures have altered the
environment in which social policy has been designed.
1. Federalism, multi-level elections and the welfare state
Key issues arising from the institutional structures of federalism that are high-
lighted in comparative literature include coordination problems between
levels of government, competition between and within levels of government
over policy jurisdiction and spending, and the multiplication of institutional
veto points. Where institutional structures multiply veto points, the ability
of the central government to oversee new policies or difficult reforms may
be diminished (see, for instance, Ames, 2001; Gerring et al., 2005; Tsebelis,
2002), although this same feature can also make retrenchment policies
more difficult (Obinger et al., 2005; Pierson, 1996). Core to the central
tenets of self and shared rule under federalism is the dispersal of political
authority between multiple jurisdictions. Not only are institutions themselves
dispersed by design, civil society organisations are likely also to be fragmen-
ted because they have to achieve influence in multiple settings where the
actors, interests and context of decision-making are likely to be different
(Pierson, 1995).
Coordination between multiple centres of political authority can be a
crucial problem for the development of federation-wide social rights. Social
policy often becomes the focus of inter-governmental competition as both
central and subnational governments seek to claim the political credit associ-
ated with social policies. In such instances, social policy debates become
central to the act of state- and nation-building itself, as multiple tiers of gov-
ernment attempt to use them to bolster their legitimacy and popular alle-
giance to either national or regional communities (Banting, 2005, p. 90).
Further issues arise where the initiation of new social policies in certain sub-
national units pre-empt initiatives in related fields at the national level, and
make agreements over new national policies more contentious because
they appear to challenge the autonomy of sub-units already operating pol-
icies in this sphere, or because subnational policies circumscribe options
open to the central government (Pierson, 1995, p. 456). On the flip-side, sub-
national units have often been sites of policy innovation. In both Brazil and
India, the major new social assistance programmes of the 2000s – Bolsa
Família, and the MGNREGA – began their life within individual municipalities
or states within the federations.
While we are primarily concerned with the political effects of federalism on
social policy in this article, the fiscal determinants are of course important too.
As by now classic texts in the field of fiscal federalism suggest, fiscal decentra-
lisation can increase horizontal competition between sub-units, generating
pressures to ‘race to the bottom’ by cutting taxes and thereby social
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expenditure in order to attract mobile capital and avoid becoming ‘welfare
magnets’ (Tiebout, 1956). However this dynamic is mediated by the design
of fiscal federalism, and the division of taxation and expenditure responsibil-
ities between the central government and states. Where control over expen-
diture but not taxation is devolved to the subnational level, horizontal tax
competition is likely to be reduced and subnational governments may
increase expenditure by over-spending common resources (Rodden, 2003).
Federalism may also affect the ability of central states to raise revenues to
finance social expenditure. As Lieberman (2003) showed of Brazil, federalism
impeded the ability of the poor majority to make national, class-based
demands for progressive taxation because elites in wealthier regions per-
ceived demands for greater direct taxation to imply redistribution to poorer
regions. But degrees of centralisation within federal systems change across
time. Brazil underwent a period of recentralisation in inter-governmental
relations under President Cardoso, which has been sustained under his succes-
sors. The tax capacity of the central Brazilian state, its ability to impose subna-
tional fiscal discipline, as well as to administer new forms of social policy were
all enhanced in this period. The central government also used earmarked taxes
called ‘contributions’, not shared with state and local governments, to raise
revenues for social sector expenditure buoyed by the cross-class social
coalition of working class, social movement and middle class actors that
supported the PT (Partido dos Trabalhadores or Workers’ Party) government
(Schneider, 2015). Revenues from such taxes increased from 9% of GDP in
1994 to 13% in 2010 (Schneider, 2015, p. 6). Thus it is important to remember
that degrees of centralisation and coordination within federal systems change
over time, with implications for taxation and expenditure.
One feature that has an important influence on the degree of centralisa-
tion, beyond the constitutional inter-governmental allocation of powers and
responsibilities, is the nature of the party system. Literature on elections in
multi-level settings suggests that there are substantial differences in the
degree of political coordination in federal settings which are caused by differ-
ent structures of political competition. Of particular relevance to this discus-
sion is the extent to which one tier of government is pre-eminent over the
other in the electoral arena. The extent to which either the national or subna-
tional tier of government predominates in the minds of voters varies substan-
tially across federal systems. In some federal systems, subnational elections
are clearly subordinate (such as Germany and Brazil). In such systems,
voters use information about national policies, parties or presidential candi-
dates as a heuristic for making decisions about how to vote in subnational
elections (Borges & Lloyd, 2016; Rodden & Wibbels, 2011). In other multi-
level electoral systems (such as Canada or India), subnational elections have
greater autonomy from the national layer. Factors that have been demon-
strated to increase the extent to which subnational elections are dominated
COMMONWEALTH & COMPARATIVE POLITICS 333
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [K
ing
's 
Co
lle
ge
 L
on
do
n]
 at
 02
:48
 05
 O
cto
be
r 2
01
7 
by national politics, and the extent to which parties coordinate with each
other at the national level, include fiscal and political centralisation (Brancati,
2008; Chhibber & Kollman, 2004; Diwakar, 2010), holding concurrent elections
to both tiers of government (Borges & Lloyd, 2016; Brancati, 2008), the
absence of territorial cleavages (Schakel, 2013) and presidentialism (Hicken
& Stoll, 2011). In more decentralised parliamentary federal systems such as
India and Canada with strong territorialised regional and ethnic identities,
voters are more likely to attribute policy responsibility to their regional or
subnational government. They can also be more likely to vote in subnational
elections based on the performance of the subnational tier, rather than the
national level (on India see Yadav & Palshikar, 2009).
In the following section we look at how federal and party systems intersect
in Brazil, where presidential coattails are important for subnational elections
and in India, where subnational elections have a first order character in elec-
toral competition.6 We then move on to analyse the implications of these con-
trasting dynamics for social policy.
2. Comparing federalism and party systems in Brazil and India
Brazil’s electoral system is unusual and has led to an extreme form of multi-
partyism, with 32 political parties represented in Congress and one of the
highest number of effective parties in the world. In 2010 the effective
number of parties in the lower house of Congress was over 11 by votes,
and over 10 by seats (Epstein, 2012, p. 47). There is no threshold for parties
to obtain seats in Congress, and politicians find it easy to create new
parties. Most parties are amorphous in ideological and programmatic terms
and many politicians switch parties several times during the course of their
careers. In the lower house, candidates win election on the basis of open
list proportional representation (a first past the post system is used for the
Senate races.) This diminishes the incentives for party discipline, as candidates
in the same party essentially compete against each other. The parties that
compete for power, and the coalitions that form at the state level, are different
across states. In this sense Brazil has a high level of political fragmentation,
and a lower degree of party system nationalisation than other Latin American
countries.
However certain features of the Brazilian system strengthen the ‘first order’
character of presidential elections, making Brazil’s party system far more
nationally integrated than India’s. Since 1994 presidential, gubernatorial,
and legislative elections at the state and federal level have concurred in
Brazil, strengthening the alignment between national and subnational elec-
tion outcomes (Borges & Lloyd, 2016, p. 107). With the exception of small
groups of indigenous people, Brazil does not have the same territorialised
ethnic identities that help to increase the primacy of subnational election
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contests in multi-ethnic federations such as India (Borges & Lloyd, 2016;
Schakel, 2013). Furthermore, the Workers’ Party (PT), in power at the federal
level from 2003 to 2016, is a truly national party with representation in
almost all of Brazil’s municípios (counties). Presidential politics shape state
politics because, as Borges and Lloyd (2016, p. 104) argue: ‘No candidate for
subnational executive office receives as much media attention or as many
campaign contributions as the top presidential contenders do.’
At the national level, a system of ‘coalitional presidentialism’ helps to
achieve coordination within Congress despite the high number of parties
(Melo & Pereira, 2013). This has elements of a parliamentary system, in that
presidents are elected from parties that never control more than 20 per
cent of the seats in either house, and therefore have to stitch together com-
plicated multiparty coalitions in order to govern. As the party system has frag-
mented in recent years, those coalitions have grown in size. In the
government of Dilma Rousseff (2011–2016), the president impeached in
2016, the coalition was made up of 10 different parties. Presidents placate
these parties and keep them in the governing coalition by awarding them
ministerial posts (sometimes with the right to appoint large numbers of
people at lower levels of the ministry) and federal resources for their home
states.
In recent years the coordination of parties at the national level has been
supported by a trend of fiscal recentralisation. Under the new constitution
that was promulgated at the end of the military dictatorship in 1988, Brazil
entered an era of decentralisation. Because the dictatorship had centralised
power in many areas, there was popular pressure and regional political inter-
est in decentralising. Decentralisation became associated with democratisa-
tion. However, this process began to be partially reversed in the 1990s, in
part because state spending got out of control, jeopardising the fiscal equili-
brium of the federal government. Under President Fernando Henrique
Cardoso (1995–2002), a fiscal responsibility law reined in state spending. In
the same period, Cardoso’s government decentralised expenditure responsi-
bilities to the municipal level in order to make it more difficult for governors to
divert revenues towards patronage (Dickovick, 2006). New centre-local lin-
kages helped the federal government restrain governors who had been
empowered in the process of democratisation. Significantly for the story in
this paper, social policy was the most substantial area of expenditure respon-
sibility to be transferred to the municipalities (Dickovick, 2006; Fenwick, 2016).
The federal government thus reduced the spending capacity of the estados
while also enhancing fiscal space at the federal level by expanding taxation.7
New revenues collected by the federal government were increasingly directed
towards the social sector from Cardoso onwards (Melo, 2008, p. 176; Schnei-
der, 2015), and were directed via municipalities rather than the estados
(Fenwick, 2016).
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India also has a high level of political fragmentation though not as extreme
as Brazil’s. A total of 35 political parties found representation in the Lok Sabha
(lower house of parliament) in the 2014 elections. Each state today effectively
has its own party system in which different parties and political leaders are
significant. Most regional parties have a strong base in only one state.
Regional parties are dominant in many states and in some have completely
sidelined national parties. From 1984 onwards, this increasingly complex
regional scenario was reflected in a marked increase in the effective
number of parties by seats won from about two in the period 1952–1984,
to above six by 2004, although the number has been steadily decreasing
since 2004 to just over three today (Tillin, 2015, p. 187). And despite the
high overall number of parties in the Lok Sabha, at the state level most dis-
tricts tend towards two party competition (Chhibber & Murali, 2006). The
present-day scenario of regionalisation reversed the trend of the first four
decades after Independence in which India’s party system was relatively natio-
nalised with the Congress Party predominant, and represented across the
breadth of the country. From 1989 onwards, India entered a ‘post-Congress’
polity in which the political landscape was markedly decentralised and elec-
toral competition was no longer organised around the Congress Party (Palshi-
kar, 2013; Sridharan, 2002; Tillin, 2015).
Until the early 1970s, national and state elections were held concurrently
but have since been held according to separate five-year timetables in each
state.8 Holding state elections according to separate timetables increases
the primacy of state-level political leaders, parties and issues in election
debates. State-level issues loom large even during Lok Sabha elections.
With the partial exception of the more presidential style of the 2014 elections
in which the Narendra Modi-led BJP came to power, Lok Sabha elections since
1989 have been interpreted as the aggregation of multiple state-level con-
tests with state-level issues and actors filtering the choices that voters make
in national elections. Yadav and Palshikar (2009) argued that there are
many ways in which the state level should in fact be seen as the principal elec-
toral layer. The menu of political choices in Lok Sabha elections, the relevant
social cleavages and cultural-ideological context is determined by the state-
level party system. Furthermore, voters are often focused on the performance
of their state government even when voting in national elections (Yadav &
Palshikar, 2009, p. 57). This assumption is borne out by survey data collected
in the National Election Studies conducted by CSDS (Centre for the Study of
Developing Societies)-Lokniti, as shown in Table 1. Taken together over half
of all voters in the 2009 and 2014 general elections said that they gave
more or equal importance to the state government, as compared to the
central government, when deciding how to vote, although the number iden-
tifying the state government alone fell in 2014. This does not mean that the
performance of the central government is completely absent from the
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calculations of Indian voters in general elections, nor that there are no pat-
terns in the social support base of national alliances that transcend state
boundaries (Chhibber, 2009). Rather the key point is that, especially compared
to Brazil, voters have been more likely to read national elections through the
filter of a state-level lens.
In India, by contrast to Brazil, the prevailing pattern of the period since the
early 1990s has been one of political and fiscal decentralisation but from a
starting point of a more centralised system of fiscal federalism. With the
onset of economic liberalisation in 1991, the central government’s earlier
overriding role in directing regional flows of public and private investment
was dismantled and states have become the primary gatekeepers for business
investment. In the fiscal realm, as in Brazil, India’s states also faced a debt crisis
in the late 1990s but implementation of fiscal responsibility and budget man-
agement legislation helped stabilise state finances. The fiscal position of the
states also improved as a result of new powers to raise VAT that were intro-
duced in 2005, higher devolution of central taxation as a result of improved
revenue collection, overall high economic growth and low interest rates (Gov-
ernment of India, 2015). Overall, the proportion of taxes collected by central
and state governments (before centre-state transfers take place) looks
similar to Brazil with 62 per cent of tax revenues collected by the central
government, and 38 per cent by the states.9
These parallel processes of regionalisation in India have enhanced the first
order character of subnational elections and the decentralised nature of credit
claiming for policy initiatives by state governments, compared to Brazil. In
Brazil, as we delineate in the next section, national policy initiatives in the
field of social policy have supported gradual processes of party system natio-
nalisation, albeit in a context of continued political fragmentation.
It may be noted that these contrasting patterns might not be predicted
by looking at the formal institutional structures of federalism alone. Stepan
(1999) described Brazil and India as sitting on opposite ends of what he
called a demos constraining to demos enabling continuum. By this he
meant that institutional features of Brazilian federalism such as the over-
representation of small states in the Senate, the strong powers of the
Senate vis-à-vis the lower house, and the embedding of the allocation of
Table 1. Which level of government are voters assessing in National Elections in India?
Election Central government State government Both Can’t say
2009 20.9 31.4 20.7 18.9
2014 23.8 26 26.4 17.7
Notes: Responses to the question ‘While voting, some people give more importance to the work done by
the state government, while others give more importance to the work done by the central government
in Delhi. While voting in this election, what mattered [or will matter] to you most?’ from NES 2009 pre-
poll survey, sample size 36,641 and NES 2014 post-poll survey, sample size 20,951. Unweighted
summary data accessed from http://www.lokniti.org/ on August 17th 2016.
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inter-governmental powers in the constitution undermined the ability of
the central government to pass reforms on the basis of popular majorities
and increased the powers of minority interests. By contrast, India’s federal
institutions appeared demos enabling because states are represented in the
upper house on the basis of their population, the territorial chamber has
inferior powers to the directly elected Lok Sabha and important changes
can be made on the basis of simple parliamentary majorities. In important
ways, India’s federal system is relatively centralised in constitutional terms.
For instance, the central government has special powers to redraw state
boundaries on the basis of a simple parliamentary majority or to suspend
elected state governments by imposing ‘President’s Rule’. Residual power
resides with the central government rather than the states. In practice,
however, as we have started to detail in this section and will explore
further in the following section, what has transpired in Brazil and India is
rather different than might be expected based on a reading of institutional
structures alone. In Brazil, successive presidents have succeeded in mana-
ging presidential coalitions that allow them to pass social policies respond-
ing to the interests of popular majorities and that have had broadly
redistributive effects. In India, on the other hand, despite the apparently
demos enabling characteristics of the Indian constitution, the central gov-
ernment has not been able to override the state governments in the
field of social policy. We cannot predict the impact of federalism on
policy processes in either country without examining the interaction
between formal institutions and multi-level elections.
3. Inter-Governmental competition over social policy in an era
of expansion
3.1. Centralisation of credit claiming in Brazil
Brazil, historically, was a good example of a federal system in which empow-
ered subnational tiers of government were able to stymie the achievement of
national policy goals including welfare provision (Fenwick, 2016, p. 8). In
Brazil’s 1988 constitution, the Union, states, Federal District of Brasília and
the municipalities are jointly allocated the power to ‘fight the causes of
poverty and the causes of marginalisation, promoting the social integration
of the unfavoured sectors’ (Article 23X), and education, health and social
security are areas where there is concurrent legislative jurisdiction between
the federal and state governments. In practice, as a result of the decentralisa-
tion that occurred alongside democratisation, state governors were able to
capture flows of patronage and exercise much discretion in social sector
expenditure. The municipalisation reforms undertaken by the Cardoso admin-
istration in 1994 routed more social expenditure, especially in the health and
education fields, directly to the municipalities, sidestepping the estados and
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reducing their fiscal autonomy (Dickovick, 2006). This process supported the
federal government in exerting more effective control over social policy,
and in claiming political credit for such policies.
During Cardoso’s administration (1995–2002) and that of his successor Luiz
Inácio ‘Lula’ da Silva (2003–2010), spending on new social policies was scaled
up and centralised. This harked back to an earlier period under President
Getúlio Vargas (1930–1945; 1950–1954) who was known as the ‘father of
the poor’ because under his rule the first national labour and social benefits
were established (Levine, 1998). The flagship social programme Bolsa
Família (Family Allowance) is clearly identified as a federal policy and national
level politicians have been able to claim credit for it. In the section that
follows, we first review recent initiatives by the central government in the
social arena and then examine the issue of credit claiming for these policies
by national and subnational political actors.
Melo (2008, pp. 163–173) describes the extraordinary upsurge in spending
on social programmes in Brazil during the presidencies of Cardoso and Lula.
Pre-existing cash transfer schemes for non-contributory rural medical,
dental and pension services and for the elderly, poor and disabled were sup-
plemented by innovative preventative health care schemes, new funding for
basic education, and Bolsa Escola (School Allowance). Bolsa Família, which
became the linchpin of the social policy regime under Lula, is a CCT pro-
gramme begun at the city level (Campinas and the Federal District of Brasília)
in the 1990s. It supplemented the incomes of poor families on the condition
that they kept their children in school and allowed them to have the manda-
tory innoculations required by the national health service. During the presi-
dency of Cardoso, Bolsa Escola had been launched as a national
programme, and most subnational CCTs were gradually phased out for lack
of independent fiscal resources (Fenwick, 2016, p. 63). The Lula administration
expanded Bolsa Escola and merged it with three other CCT programmes to
create the flagship Bolsa Família (BF). By 2011–2012 Brazil was spending
23.5 per cent of its GDP on social programmes, a relatively high percentage
for a middle-income country. Bolsa Família accounted for 0.5 per cent
of GDP, unemployment insurance and salary supplements another 0.9
per cent of GDP, public education 5.5 per cent, health 4.5 per cent, and
pensions 12 per cent (Almeida, 2013).
Bolsa Família has become one of the largest CCTs in the world. It now
includes 13.8 million families comprising 49.6 million people, or 26 per cent
of Brazil’s population (Campello & Neri, 2014, p. 9, 32). The programme
reaches beneficiaries in 99.7 per cent of the 5570 counties (municípios) of
Brazil (Campello & Neri, 2014, p. 14, 18; see also Campello & Neri, 2013).
Politicians at the federal level, most notably Lula, have been able to
claim credit for Bolsa Família and use it to augment their electoral
appeal (Niedzwiecki, 2016). The 2010 Brazilian Electoral Panel Survey
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found that over 80 per cent of people attributed Bolsa Família to the pre-
sident, which the survey architects found ‘even more impressive when one
considers that beneficiaries enrol at their municipal government offices’
(Ames et al., 2013, p. 36). Lula changed the name of the CCT from Bolsa
Escola to Bolsa Família in order to help him claim credit for this policy,
even though it built on earlier initiatives.
The fact that the cash transfer is made directly into beneficiaries’ bank
accounts by the federal government has reduced the involvement of states
and municipalities to relatively simple administrative functions, particularly
the registration of beneficiaries. Families are eligible for the BF if their
income falls below a certain threshold (R$150 per capita per month or
about £39 at the rate of exchange of 3.86 Brazilian reais per pound). A repre-
sentative of the family must present documents to local authorities in order to
qualify for the programme. Once the family passes the means test, cash is
transferred electronically onto ATM cards issued by the Federal savings
bank, the Caixa Econômica Federal. As Fenwick notes, municipalities do see
benefits from administering CCTs such as new revenues to cover administra-
tive costs, increased social sector employment in areas that were linked to ful-
filling recipients’ conditions as well as other economic benefits for the local
economy. Such features have enhanced the cooperation of mayors with the
federal government (Fenwick, 2016, p. 73).
Because the programme is clearly identified as a presidential initiative and
was implemented via the municipalities, it has been argued that it may
provide incentives to governors to compete with or otherwise subvert the
programme at the subnational level. Niedzwiecki (2016) shows that enrol-
ment in Bolsa Família is lower in states run by governors opposed to the pre-
sident, because subnational governments can make it harder for the federal
government to access databases of potential beneficiaries and/or run their
own competing CCTs. However, their ability to undermine the programme
may diminish once bureaucratic routinisation sets in, and the systems
necessary for cooperation between state and federal authorities for the
implementation of Bolsa Família have been put into place. In the state of
Goiás which Niedzwiecki highlights, which had its own CCT (Renda Cidadã,
or Citizen Income) prior to the creation of Bolsa Família, there is no longer
a major competition between the state’s programme and the Federal one
as was the case in the early 2000s. The two programmes now share infor-
mation – and the Goiás state programme only covers 40,000 families
(Straiotto, 2016), compared to 320,749 families receiving Bolsa Família in
the state (Freitas, 2016). Even in its early years, the territorial dispersal of
Bolsa Família across major regions of Brazil mapped fairly closely onto
levels of poverty suggesting that political factors were not driving its distri-
bution and that the policy was being fairly implemented across the country
(Fenwick, 2016, p. 77).
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3.2. Decentralisation of credit claiming for social policy in India
In India, the constitutional allocation of responsibility for social policy has his-
torically given states a strong role, especially as the primary layer for
implementation. Like Brazil, most areas of social policy are concurrent subjects
in the Indian constitution, giving the central government and state govern-
ments shared jurisdiction. The main exception is public health, which is exclu-
sively a state subject (see Deshpande, Kailash, & Tillin, 2017). State
governments, and in the colonial period provincial administrations, have
long designed local schemes to respond to local needs or more often crises
such as famines or worker unrest. However, as political centralisation has
ebbed and flowed, so has the locus of debates about social policy. The first
prime minister to seek personal credit for a poverty reduction agenda at
the all-India level was Indira Gandhi in the early 1970s, who countered the
opposition attacks on her with a promise to ‘eradicate poverty’ (garibi
hatao). Her substantive achievements were quite limited however and
welfare initiatives were often at the heart of platforms adopted by regional
parties challenging Congress pre-eminence. Examples include mid-day
school meal programmes in the southern states of Tamil Nadu and Andhra
Pradesh introduced by chief ministers from regional parties. Furthermore, in
the context of economic liberalisation, federal decisions to implement
‘below poverty line’ targeting in the Public Distribution System (through
which subsidised foodgrains are distributed) effectively pushed the responsi-
bility for maintaining major subsidy programmes to the states. Since states
feared a backlash from voters for retrenchment in the food programme,
many found their own resources to maintain or expand existing levels of pro-
vision. As Jenkins (1999, p. 182) argued, one reason why the central govern-
ment was able to cut back food subsidies in the 1990s was because it was
‘state governments, the first line of public defence, who must face the irate
public. Electorates vent their frustration at the most accessible level of govern-
ment, not necessarily the one most responsible for their problems’.
It was in the 2000s, as economic growth soared to over 8 per cent per
annum and the Congress-led United Progressive Alliance (UPA) came to
power on a social democratic platform that India witnessed renewed
central government activity in the field of social welfare, with a major expan-
sion of both social expenditure and the scale of government interventions.
The thrust of policy goals also changed with an increasing focus on embed-
ding social rights through legislation that underpinned the entitlements of
citizens and their right to demand social provision (for an overview see
Harriss, 2013; Ruparelia, 2013).
The biggest initiative of the first term of the UPA government, during which
it was supported in parliament by left parties, was the passage of the National
Rural Employment Guarantee Act (NREGA) in 2005 which in theory guarantees
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up to 100 days of unskilled employment paid at theminimumwage to any rural
household that demands it. The work is conducted on public works schemes
designed by panchayats (village councils). The NREGA built on an older
Employment Guarantee Scheme in the state of Maharashtra dating back to
the early 1970s, but was rolled out on a national scale and became the flagship
social policy of the UPA’s first term. Initially it covered the 200 most ‘backward’
districts, butwas extended to cover all rural households in 2008. It was primarily
federally financed with the central government providing 100 per cent of the
funding for wages under the act which are paid directly into workers’ bank
accounts, and 75 per cent of material costs of the public works schemes
carried out under the act. The Congress Party’s manifesto for the 2009 Lok
Sabha elections included a promise to legislate on a Right to Food. Although
the Congress-led UPA won a second term in 2009, progress on social policy
making slowed down in the tailwind of the global financial crisis and with
growing concern in parts of government about the fiscal implications of
further expanding subsidy schemes. However a NFSA, which again expanded
the Public Distribution System,was eventually passed by executive order in late
2013, on the insistence of Congress Party President Sonia Gandhi, and retro-
spectively approved by parliament.10 The expenditure on social policy by the
central government saw a five-fold increase between 1991–1992 and 2012–
2013 (Kapur & Nangia, 2015, p. 79) but overall social spending is lower than
in Brazil. At its peak in 2009–2010, spending on MGNREGA accounted for
approximately 0.6 per cent of GDP (Zepeda, McDonald, Panda, & Kumar,
2013, p. 14), while public health expenditure accounted for 1.4 per cent and
education for just 3.7 per cent of GDP in 2014.11
When designing these new social policies, the Congress Party at the Centre
had a clear eye on the potential political dividends they would yield. As a
leading architect of the Congress manifestos in 2004 and 2009 admitted,
the Congress Party clearly saw the rights-based policies of the first UPA
term in political terms, whereas their allies on the left – whose support for
the policies in parliament was important – saw them more programmatically.
In the second term of the UPA, the respondent noted that the NFSA was
passed so late that it made it more difficult for the Congress Party to get pol-
itical credit for it.12 The party was also aware that credit for social programmes
could be claimed by state governments led by opposition parties, especially
because state-level governments are the primary layer for the implementation
of most social policy.
A concern that opposition-ruled state governments might seek to appro-
priate credit for NREGA led to its renaming after Mahatma Gandhi in
October 2009, a few months after the general election that returned the Con-
gress to power. Indian newspapers widely reported that this initiative was
taken to make it more difficult for opposition parties at the state level to
steal the credit for the programme. As the Times of India explained:
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While Congress had political hopes from it, BJP [Bharatiya Janata Party] has been
quick to brand NREGA as its own. With state governments being its implement-
ing agencies, [a] few ruled by BJP prefixed their names to it while some CMs
[chief ministers] even put their pictures on the job cards. The aggressive BJP
bid to appropriate the job scheme sent a wave of concern in [sic] Congress
camp.13
Other schemes of the UPA government, such as the Jawaharlal Nehru National
Urban Renewal Mission, Indira Gandhi National Widow Pension Scheme and
Indira Gandhi National Disability Pension Scheme were named at their con-
ception after ﬁgures from the Gandhi-Nehru Congress dynasty. The National
Old Age Pension scheme that had been introduced by the earlier BJP-led
National Democratic Alliance central government in 1995 was relaunched
under the new name Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension scheme in
November 2007, with a lowered age of 60 rather than 65 for eligibility.
While there is some evidence that, like the Bolsa Família in Brazil, MGNREGA
also contributed to the Congress’ re-election in the 2009 general elections, the
effects were likely on the margins (Manor, 2012). It was state governments
that appeared to garner much of the electoral credit. Some state governments
worked creatively to rebrand central schemes as state government pro-
grammes, or dovetailed national policies with state-level initiatives which
complemented or extended the scope of central schemes. In addition,
many popular chief ministers introduced their own schemes branded by
use of the chief minister’s name (such as ‘Amma’ canteens in Tamil Nadu)
or by using the word ‘Chief Minister’ in the title (such as the Mukhyamantri
Khadyann Sahayata Yojna, the Chief Minister’s Food Security Campaign in
Chhattisgarh which is effectively an extended and over-hauled version of
the central government’s Public Distribution System).
Election survey data confirms that state governments have been reason-
ably successful in claiming credit in the eyes of the electorate for social pol-
icies that had been initiated by the central government, in stark contrast to
Brazil. In the run-up to the 2014 elections, when asked which level of govern-
ment was responsible for the MGNREGA, 42 per cent of those who had bene-
fited from the programme identified the state government as responsible
compared to 27 per cent who identified the central government. The attribu-
tion of responsibility to the state governments was even higher in the fields of
health and pensions (see Table 2).14
Thus in India, attribution of policy responsibility for the major social protec-
tion programmes is much less clear to voters than for a programme such as
Bolsa Família in Brazil. As state governments are the primary layer of
implementation for most programmes initiated by the central government
and in some instances add to or extend central programmes with initiatives
of their own, it is difficult for voters to accurately parse where responsibility
for different initiatives lies. The chains of electoral accountability in India’s
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federal system are quite opaque. Furthermore, the importance of state gov-
ernments in implementing central policies has ensured that there is substan-
tial territorial unevenness in their implementation. Poorer states have long
spent less than they are entitled to under federal schemes as a result of
lower state capacity (Mathew & Moore, 2011), meaning that central pro-
grammes are not well targeted to the poorest citizens. As a wide literature
attests there is also substantial variation among poor – and rich – states in
terms of how well centrally sponsored social programmes, such as
MGNREGA, are implemented (see, for instance, Chopra, 2015; Deshpande
et al., 2017; Drèze & Khera, 2014; Drèze & Khera, 2015; Maiorano, 2014; Roy,
2015; Tillin, Deshpande, & Kailash, 2015).
4. Epilogue: federal dynamics and social policy in an era of
retrenchment
The bulk of this article has considered the dynamics of social policy during a
period in which provision was expanded in both countries in the course of the
2000s. But in both Brazil and India, the political and fiscal climate has altered in
the 2010s. In this final section we reflect on signs that changes in national
regimes in both Brazil and India, and increasing fiscal pressures (especially
in Brazil) might alter the federal dimensions of social policy.
The election of a BJP-led government with Narendra Modi at the helm in
India in 2014 saw the emergence of a more polarised debate about social
policy at the federal level, with some supporters of Modi openly critical of
the emergence of what they described as an ‘entitlements’ culture under
the UPA regime. After making disparaging noises about MGNREGA in the
early months of his premiership,15 in the 2016 budget in the face of
drought conditions in many rural areas, Modi moved to reassert his adminis-
tration’s commitment to the programme. But there have been signs of a
change in the dynamics of claims making and centre-state relations in the
Table 2. Who do voters credit for social programmes?
Scheme Benefited
Not
benefited
(of those
benefited)
Central
government
State
government
Local
politician or
party worker
Local
bureaucrat
Can’t
say
MGNREGA 20 80 27 42 16 5 10
Free medical
facilitiesa
21 79 20 56 10 5 9
Pensions 17 83 19 54 13 4 10
Notes: Responses to question on whether you had benefited from particular schemes, and ‘if benefited,
who would you give credit for it: central government, state govt., local politicians/party worker, or
local bureaucrat/government officer?’ Lokniti, 2014 post-poll survey, total respondents 22,301. Percen-
tages calculated based on unweighted summary survey data downloaded from http://www.lokniti.org/.
Accessed August 17th 2016.
aThis question refers to the National Rural Health Mission.
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field of social policy that could move in two alternative directions. On the one
hand, the implementation of the Fourteenth Finance Commission recommen-
dations in 2015 devolved substantial fiscal responsibility for social policies to
the states. This gave rise to fears that the central government would retreat
from the social sector leading to increased regional inequalities in provision
and a ‘race to the bottom’ as social expenditure is squeezed out by other
fiscal pressures within the states. At a minimum, the increase in centre-state
fiscal transfers, and reduction in the number of federally financed ‘centrally
sponsored schemes’, will cement the centrality of the states for social
policy. On the other hand, the Modi government is making a big push
towards its own form of cash transfer (building on initial exercises under
the previous government), known in India as ‘direct benefit transfers’
(DBTs). The government is seeking to unify existing DBTs under one platform,
and many would like to see such cash payments replace the in-kind subsidy
regime (for a recent overview of these arguments see Joshi, 2016). Modi, an
arch centraliser whose image is already omnipresent across government pub-
licity materials, will be well aware of the opportunities to claim credit person-
ally for a unified DBT programme that he could use to establish an
unmediated connection to voters across India in ways not dissimilar to Lula
in Brazil.
In Brazil, Bolsa Família had enhanced the Workers’ Party’s image as a pro-
gressive pro-poor party, at least until the economic recession that began in
2015 and corruption allegations that targeted senior PT leaders. Anti-corrup-
tion investigations and an anti-PT movement against Lula’s successor Presi-
dent Dilma Rousseff led to the latter’s impeachment in 2016. Under
Rousseff’s successor, President Michel Temer (2016-present), there has been
increasing criticism of the scope of social policy amidst a climate of fiscal aus-
terity and economic liberalisation. The Temer administration has hinted that
Bolsa Família includes too many people and should be temporary, even
though in its early days it promised to preserve the programme, for fear of
the electoral consequences of not doing so. The Temer government also
passed a controversial constitutional amendment that froze government
spending in real terms for 20 years, and this has already begun to squeeze
spending on social programmes (Sátyro 2017). While consensus in Congress
in favour of social inclusion is still robust, as detailed by Pereira and Bertholini
in this issue, that belief is combined with an opposition to tax increases. There-
fore in periods of recession the scale of the commitment to social policy will
be reduced. This has happened under Temer, and the trend is likely to con-
tinue beyond the 2018 presidential election, given the size of Brazil’s
federal budget deficit and the conservative shift in Brazilian politics.
Whether this opens up new space for subnational activism in the sphere of
social policy remains to be seen.
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5. Conclusion
In this article we have demonstrated that the effects of federalism for social
policy cannot be read off institutional structures alone. It is important to
pay attention to degrees of party system nationalisation and fiscal centralisa-
tion in order to understand how federal constitutional settings influence the
shape of social policy design and implementation in periods of social policy
expansion. We have shown that in Brazil, greater federal initiative in social
policy from President Cardoso onwards was made possible by expanded rev-
enues at the federal level, and used particularly by President Lula to secure the
prestige of his Workers Party. The vast majority of Brazilian voters see Bolsa
Família as a presidential policy, and also typically vote in elections based on
their assessment of national candidates and policies. By contrast, in India
we demonstrated that much of the credit for the expansion of social provision
by the central government was claimed by state governments in the eyes of
voters. This took place in a regionalised party system in which states remain
the primary level of identification for most voters.
Brazil and India are contrasting cases that illustrate the importance of two
neglected features of federalism in shaping social policy: inter-governmental
competition and the degree of nationalisation of party systems. In Brazil,
where parties are more national than they are in India and politicians at the
federal level capture voter attention to a far greater extent than their state
counterparts, the expansion of CCTs has largely benefited national leaders,
and has reinforced party system nationalisation. In India, by contrast, where
state elections have more autonomy from the federal level and parties are
more regionalised than in Brazil, social welfare has become an increasingly
prominent part of state-level electoral contests. The effectiveness of social
policy implementation across states is highly variable and depends upon
the initiatives of chief ministers. While regional political autonomy has been
a bulwark of federal stability in India helping to prevent internal conflict, it
helps to perpetuate territorial unevenness in the functioning of social policy.
Notes
1. The view that multicultural policies, which include but are not limited to federal
arrangements, restrict the development of welfare states has been challenged
(see Banting & Kymlicka, 2006).
2. The attribution of responsibility across areas of social policy is likely to differ.
Whereas survey data clearly shows the large majority of voters identify Bolsa
Família as a presidential policy, they attribute responsibility for health care
and schools to local governments (Niedzwiecki, 2016).
3. The BJP-led Modi government since 2014 has sought to drive reforms from the
top down using the biometric technology platform Aadhar, which signals an aim
to move in a more nationalised direction, however the major implementation
challenges remain at the state level.
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4. In making this observation, we do not necessarily imply that social policies
determine election outcomes. Rather we are interested in the process by
which voters attribute policy responsibility to one level or the other, and ulti-
mately what the implications of this are for the development of welfare
provisioning.
5. It should be noted that the overall tax take remains much lower in India than in
Brazil, which has reached near OECD levels of almost 37 per cent tax/GDP ratio.
In India, general government revenues increased from 17.73 per cent to 19.72
per cent between 2002 and 2012 (see Maiorano and Manor, this special issue),
nevertheless even this was a period of substantial revenue growth in relative
terms for India.
6. The concept of ‘first order’ elections comes from the literature on European poli-
tics, in which national elections are seen as having precedence over ‘second
order’ elections to the European parliament (Reif & Schmitt, 1980).
7. In 2016, the federal level of government collected 60 per cent of all tax revenue,
with the states getting 23 per cent, and the municipal governments only 17 per
cent (Fucs, 2016).
8. The Modi government has proposed moving back to a system of concurrent
elections, although the absence of fixed term parliaments in India complicates
such a proposal.
9. Calculated from Handbook of Statistics on Indian Economy 2015–2016, Reserve
Bank of India 2016, Table 115 ‘Direct and Indirect Tax Revenues of Central and
State Governments’.
10. The long debates over this bill, passed in the latter days of the UPA government,
reflected the absence of a strong consensus within the Congress Party and its
wider political coalition about the expansion of social sector expenditure. It
coincided with renewed debate about replacing subsidies with direct cash trans-
fers, an option that was left open in the legislation when it was eventually
passed. The absence of a strong consensus among national parties in favour
of distributive social spending in India contrasts distinctly with the situation in
Brazil, and reflects continued concerns in India about implementation failures
and diversion of funds due to clientelism or corruption. These observations
draw on Louise Tillin’s fieldwork in 2013 on the NFSA.
11. Health and Education figures from the World Bank website, http://data.
worldbank.org/indicator/SE.XPD.TOTL.GD.ZS and http://data.worldbank.org/
indicator/SH.XPD.PUBL.ZS, accessed September 21st 2016
12. Interview in New Delhi on August 11th 2016
13. ‘NREGA gets named after Mahatma Gandhi,’ Times of India, October 3rd 2009.
http://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/india/NREGA-gets-named-after-Mahatma-
Gandhi/articleshow/5081715.cms. Accessed August 19th 2016. This renaming
departs from an earlier decision not to name the scheme after a political
leader. The architects of the original NREGA wanted other parties to embrace
the scheme should the UPA lose power (Manor, 2012).
14. A separate survey conducted by CSDS in 2001–2002 asked a similar question
about perceptions of public goods provision. It found even higher attribution
of responsibility to state governments: when asked which level of government
was responsible for different areas of public goods provision, 72 per cent ident-
ified the state government as responsible for education facilities, 70 per cent
identified it as responsible for medical facilities, and 67 per cent credited it
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with responsibility for ration supplies (subsidised wheat and rice under the
Public Distribution System) (Chhibber, Shastri, & Sisson, 2004, p. 350).
15. In February 2015, Modi described MGNREGA as a ‘living monument of [Con-
gress] failures’. He said,
My political acumen tells me that MNREGA should not be shut down. I will
not make such a mistake because MNREGA is a living monument of your
failures. 60 years after independence you still have to send people to dig
holes in the ground. So I will celebrate this with pomp and splendour. I will
tell the world that these holes you are digging are for your own sins.
(Joshua & Sriram, 2015)
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